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Abstract
Dynamic problems of pollution and resource management with
stock externalities often require a di⁄erential games framework of
analysis. In addition they are represented realistically by non-linear
transition equations. However, feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE)
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1solutions, which are the desired ones in this case, are di¢ cult to ob-
tain in problems with non-linear-quadratic structure. We develop a
method to obtain numerically non-linear FBNE for a class of such
problems, with a speci￿c example for shallow lake pollution control.
We compare FBNE solutions, by considering the entire equilibrium
trajectories, with optimal management and open-loop solutions and
we show that the value of the best FBNE is in general worse than the
open-loop and optimal management solutions.
Keywords: Di⁄erential games, Pollution control, Non-linear feed-
back Nash equilibrium solution, Abel equation, Open-loop, Optimal
management.
JEL Classi￿cation: Q25, C73, C61.
1 Introduction
Many pollution control models have a similar format. Emissions as a by-
product of production or consumption accumulate into a stock of pollutants,
which is damaging in some way. Production of energy with fossil fuels, for
example, releases CO2 and this contributes to the stock of greenhouse gases,
which may cause damage through climate change. To take another example,
agricultural activities release phosphorus into lakes, and the resulting stock
of phosphorus causes a loss of ecological services, provided by these lakes.
Resource extraction problems also have a similar format, if the stock of the
resource has some direct utility besides the option to extract in the future.
For example, a forest may have an amenity or a biodiversity value besides the
option to extract wood. Another important characteristic of these problems
2is that the damage usually is a public bad. This implies that the optimal
control models, that can be set-up to handle the trade-o⁄s above, have stock
externalities, which turns the framework of analysis into a di⁄erential game.
The techniques developed in this paper apply to this general class of prob-
lems but in order to keep the presentation transparent, the paper focuses on
pollution control problems and, more speci￿cally, on the eutrophication of
lakes.
Di⁄erential games have been extensively studied during the recent decades
to analyze economic problems in areas such as industrial organization, re-
source and environmental economics or macroeconomic policy. The solution
concept that is most often used is the open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE),
where controls only depend on time (and the initial state of the system).
As it is well known, the OLNE is weakly time-consistent but not strongly
time-consistent (Ba‚ sar, 1989): it does not possess the Markov perfect prop-
erty and is not robust against unexpected changes in the state of the system.
Therefore, the feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE) is a more satisfactory so-
lution concept. It is derived in a dynamic programming framework, so that
controls depend on time and state and the solution is Markov perfect by
construction. However, solutions are usually very di¢ cult to derive. It is
straightforward to ￿nd linear feedback equilibria for problems with linear
dynamic systems and quadratic objectives, but two types of possible non-
linearities complicate matters considerably. The ￿rst one is the possibility
of strategic non-linearities. Tsutsui and Mino (1990) have shown that non-
linear equilibria may exist for a linear-quadratic formulation of the dynamic
duopoly with sticky prices and their result has later been applied to other
3problems, such as the problem of international pollution control (Dockner
and Long, 1993). The second one is the possibility of system non-linearities.
Recent advances in environmental and resource economics emphasize the
need for a realistic representation of the ecological system. Realistic model-
ing of natural systems in most cases indicates that the use of linear dynamics
for these natural processes in uni￿ed economic-ecological models might not
be a good approximation. Non-linearities in the transition equations mainly
relate to the existence of non-linear feedbacks, which are physical processes
that further impact an initial change of the system under investigation. Feed-
backs could be positive if the impact is such that the initial perturbation is
enhanced, or negative if the initial perturbation is reduced. For example, in
the study of climate change a positive feedback occurs when a higher tem-
perature, due to increased accumulation of greenhouse gases, causes evapora-
tion from the oceans which enhances the greenhouse e⁄ects. To take another
example, in the analysis of eutrophication of lakes, positive feedbacks are
related to the release of phosphorus that has been slowly accumulated in
sediments and submerged vegetation. Ignoring these non-linearities might
obscure very important characteristics that we observe in reality such as bi-
furcations and irreversibilities or hysteresis. As a consequence. the design of
policies that do not take the impact of non-linearities into account might lead
to erroneous results and non-desirable states of the ecosystem. Note that the
term feedback both refers to physical processes that yield non-linearities in
the dynamics of the system and to strategies of economic agents that depend
on the state of the system.
This paper shows how to derive the set of (non-linear) feedback Nash
4equilibria for di⁄erential games with non-linear feedbacks in the state tran-
sition. It will be clear that the solution cannot be derived analytically but
that a numerical approach is needed. This approach is valid for a general
class of symmetric non-linear di⁄erential games, but the paper will focus on
the well-known model for the eutrophication of (shallow) lakes. The basic
idea is that the dynamic programming equations can be rewritten as an or-
dinary di⁄erential equation in the feedback control of the economic agents.
This proves to be an Abel di⁄erential equation and the paper presents an
algorithm to solve it. The absence of a boundary condition implies that mul-
tiple feedback Nash equilibria exist. The boundary condition can be linked
to the resulting steady state, so that the set of feedback Nash equilibria can
be parametrized by the feasible steady states.
The results allow us to assess the e¢ ciency of the di⁄erent Nash equilibria.
It is interesting to start with the steady states and to compare this with the
literature on international pollution control, a linear-quadratic problem. This
literature developed in three steps. First, van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992)
derived the linear feedback Nash equilibrium and showed that the steady
state lies further away from the optimal management steady state than in
the open-loop Nash equilibrium. Dockner and Long (1993) characterized
the non-linear feedback Nash equilibria for this problem and showed that
the optimal management steady state can be approximated by a feedback
Nash equilibrium steady state, for small enough discount rates. Rubio and
Casino (2002) modi￿ed this result by showing that it does not hold if the
state trajectory starts below the optimal management steady state. The last
observation returns in the non-linear di⁄erential game of this paper but the
5conclusion for initial states above the optimal management steady state must
be modi￿ed as well. It can happen (for certain values of the parameters
of the problem) that the steady states of the feedback Nash equilibria do
not pass the open-loop Nash equilibrium steady state and can therefore not
approximate the optimal management steady state. Dockner and Wagener
(2006) derive necessary conditions for (non-linear) feedback Nash equilibria
through an auxiliary system of di⁄erential equations, and apply this approach
to a number of problems, among which the shallow lake problem we study
in this paper.
Furthermore, our approach allows us to compare the values of the di⁄erent
solutions, and not only the steady states. Note that because we consider
symmetric solutions to a symmetric problem, in equilibrium the economic
agents have the same value of the objective, which can be denoted as the
value of that equilibrium. In this way, equilibria can be ranked. Even if
the steady states are close, the equilibrium trajectories and the resulting
values can be very di⁄erent. In our approach we derive the feedback control
functions numerically and we can therefore also calculate each equilibrium
trajectory and resulting value, as a function of the initial state. It will be
shown in this paper that the value of the best feedback Nash equilibrium
is generally worse than the value of the open-loop Nash equilibrium, and
therefore a fortiori worse than the value under optimal management.
62 A Class of Non-Linear Di⁄erential Games
in Pollution Control
Consider a situation where n economic agents take actions ai, i = 1;2;:::;n,
at each point in time t, with which they a⁄ect the state of a natural system,
that is shared by all the agents. The actions could, for example, be emissions
of greenhouse gases due to industrial activities, or phosphorus loadings into
a lake due to agricultural activities. The economic agents in these cases are
countries, concerned about climate change, or communities, concerned about
the eutrophication of a lake that they share. The action ai generates bene￿ts
according to a strictly increasing and concave utility function U(ai), which
is assumed to be the same for all agents. The evolution of pollutant in the




ai(t) ￿ bx(t) + f(x(t));x(0) = x0: (1)
The state variable x could be interpreted, for example, as accumulated green-
house gases or accumulated phosphorus in a lake. Besides the standard linear
degradation term ￿bx, non-linear feedbacks occur that are represented by the
function f(x), which is an increasing non-linear function of the state variable
x. In the application that follows, the function f(x) is a convex-concave
function with a switching point in between, where f0(x) is maximal. The
stock of pollutants x causes environmental damage (or equivalently, reduces
the ￿ ow of useful services generated by the natural system) according to a
strictly increasing and convex damage function D(x), which is also assumed
7to be the same for all agents. It follows that the ￿ ow of net bene￿ts accruing
to each agent at each point in time is given by U(ai(t))￿D(x(t)). Each agent
is choosing a strategy ai (at this point assumed to be only a function of time)







￿￿t[U(ai(t)) ￿ D(x(t))]dt;i = 1;2;:::;n; (2)
subject to (1), where ￿ > 0 is a discount rate, common for all agents.
The game aspect is standard: all actions add to the public bad, so that
each agent generates a negative externality for the other agents. Optimal
management requires to choose the set of strategies {a1;a2;:::;an} in order









U(ai(t)) ￿ nD(x(t))]dt; (3)









and Pontryagin￿ s maximum principle yields the necessary conditions
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0(ai) + ￿ = 0;i = 1;2;:::;n; (5)
_ x(t) = a(t) ￿ bx(t) + f(x(t));x(0) = x0; (6)
_ ￿(t) = [￿ + b ￿ f
0(x(t))]￿(t) + nD
0(x(t)); (7)
Solving (5) for ai, and substituting the result in equation (6) yields the
Modi￿ed Hamiltonian Dynamic System (MHDS), in the state-costate space
(x;￿), for the optimal control problem associated with optimal management.
It is convenient, for demonstrating the results later, to rewrite this into the
MHDS in the state-control space (x;a). Di⁄erentiating equation (5) with
respect to time, and substituting the result and (5) in equation (7) leads to
U
00(ai(t))_ ai(t) = [￿ + b ￿ f
0(x(t))]U
0(ai(t)) ￿ nD
0(x(t));i = 1;2;:::;n: (8)
In order to demonstrate the results, it is convenient to specify the func-
tions U;D and f. The equations simplify considerably if it is assumed that
the utility function U has a constant elasticity of marginal utility equal to 1,
so that U(ai) = lnai: Furthermore, it is assumed that the damage function
has a simple quadratic form: D(x) = cx2. The parameter c can be inter-
preted as the relative importance the agent attaches to the environmental
damage in relation to the utility of the action that causes the damage.
Equation (8) reduces to
9_ ai(t) = ￿[￿ + b ￿ f
0(x(t))]ai(t) + na
2
i(t)2cx(t);i = 1;2;:::;n: (9)
Because of symmetry, multiplication by n yields
_ a(t) = ￿[￿ + b ￿ f
0(x(t))]a(t) + a
2(t)2cx(t): (10)
Equations (6) and (10) form the MHDS in the state-control space (x;a),
where a denotes the total action of all the agents together. As it is shown
in Brock and Starrett (2003), under the assumptions made on the U(ai),
D(x) and f(x) functions, this MHDS has an odd number of steady states.
The ￿rst and the last steady states are locally stable. The locally stable
steady states have the saddle-point property, with a one-dimensional globally
stable manifold, and the locally unstable steady states, with possibly complex
eigenvalues, lie between two locally stable steady states.
It is straightforward to derive the open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE)
of this game by applying Pontryagin￿ s maximum principle to the individual
optimal control problems (2). This leads to the following simple modi￿cations
in the necessary conditions
U
0(ai) + ￿i = 0;i = 1;2;:::;n; (11)
_ x(t) = a(t) ￿ bx(t) + f(x(t));x(0) = x0; (12)
_ ￿i(t) = [￿ + b ￿ f
0(x(t))]￿i(t) + 2cx(t); (13)
where ￿i denotes the costate of the optimal control problem for agent i. The
10same manipulations as above ￿nally yield the MHDS in the state-control
space (x;a), consisting of equation( 6) and






The function f(x) represents the internal feedbacks in the natural system.
Many natural systems have been carefully investigated and therefore f(x) will
be chosen according to the speci￿cation that has a good ￿t to the observations
of one of these natural systems, namely the shallow lake.
2.1 The Shallow Lake
Shallow lakes have been intensively studied over the last two decades and
it has been shown that the essential dynamics of the eutrophication process
can be modelled by the di⁄erential equation
_ P(t) = L(t) ￿ sP(t) + r
P 2(t)
P 2(t) + m2;P(0) = P0; (15)
where P is the amount of phosphorus sequestered in algae, L is the input of
phosphorus (the "loading"), s is the rate of loss consisting of sedimentation,
out￿ ow and sequestration in other biomass, r is the maximum rate of internal
loading and m is the anoxic level (see for an extensive treatment of the lake
model Carpenter and Cottingham, 1997, or Sche⁄er, 1997). Less is known
about deep lakes but from what is known it can be expected that the same
type of model is adequate. By substituting x = P
m, a = L
r, b = sm
r and by
changing the time scale to rt
m, equation (15) can be rewritten as
11_ x(t) = a(t) ￿ bx(t) +
x2(t)
x2(t) + 1
;x(0) = x0: (16)
The parameter b can vary considerably across lakes. It indicates whether the
dynamics of the lake has bifurcations with hysteresis e⁄ects or irreversibil-
ities. If a is constant, three situations can occur. For high values of b,
equation (16) has one stable steady state for each value of a. For medium
values of b, however, some values of a yield two stable steady states, so that
a hysteresis e⁄ect occurs. For low values of b, the high steady states are
irreversible (for details see M￿ler, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (2003)). By
comparing equation (16) with equation (1), it can be seen that the shallow
lake model is an example of a natural system with internal feedbacks, where
the non-linear convex-concave function f(x) is speci￿ed as f(x) = x2
x2+1. If
the lake is shared by a number of communities, say n, that develop agri-
cultural activities around the lake, the loading of phosphorus a is the total
loading of these communities: a =
Pn
i=1 ai.
M￿ler, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (2003) present and compare the opti-
mal management solution and the open-loop Nash equilibrium for the shal-
low lake. With the speci￿cation for the function f(x), the general analysis
above immediately provides the MHDS for these two outcomes, consisting of
equation (16) and
_ a(t) = ￿(￿ + b ￿
2x(t)
(x2(t) + 1)2)a(t) + 2ca
2(t)x(t) (17)
for optimal management and
12_ a(t) = ￿(￿ + b ￿
2x(t)





for the open-loop Nash equilibrium. The parameter b is ￿xed at b = 0:6
(the hysteresis case) and the discount rate ￿ is ￿xed at ￿ = 0:03. If the
parameter c is high enough (e.g. c = 1), the MHDS for optimal management
has one saddle-point stable steady state in the so-called oligotrophic region
(low levels of pollution). However, the open-loop Nash equilibrium with two
communities has in this case two saddle-point stable steady states (with an
unstable steady state in between): one in the oligotrophic region and one
in the eutrophic region (high levels of pollution). Wagener (2003) shows
that a solution trajectory of the shallow lake system described by the MHDS
which starts at a point (x0;a0) > 0; either ends up on one of the two saddle
points, or produces a control which goes to in￿nity in ￿nite time, or does not
satisfy the transversality condition at in￿nity limt!1 ￿(t)e￿￿t = 0: Note that
the two-player problem is equivalent to the optimal management problem
with the parameter c divided by two. A Skiba point exists which means
that for low initial levels of pollution it is best to follow Nash equilibrium
strategies towards the oligotrophic steady state, but for high initial levels of
pollution it is best to follow Nash equilibrium strategies towards the eutrophic
steady state. The outcomes are depicted in Figures 1a (phase diagram) and
1b (stable manifolds) for optimal management, and in Figures 2a (phase
diagram) and 2b (stable manifolds) for the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here.
These outcomes are important benchmarks for the feedback Nash equi-
13libria that are derived in the next section. A full analysis of Skiba points in
the shallow lake model can be found in Wagener (2003). A stochastic shallow
lake is analysed in Dechert and O￿ Donnell (2006) and an empirical analysis
for a Dutch lake is presented in Hein (2006).
3 Feedback Nash Equilibria
The feedback Nash equilibria (FBNE) for the class of non-linear di⁄eren-
tial games, speci￿ed in Section 2, result from solving the dynamic program-
ming or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations in the value functions Vi. The
functions and parameters in the problem formulation (2) do not directly de-
pend on time, so that the problem is stationary. Therefore the equilibrium
strategies can be represented in a time-stationary feedback form ai = hi(x),
i = 1;2;:::;n, and the value functions Vi only depend on the state x. Further-
more, the problem is symmetric and only symmetric equilibria are consid-
ered, so that the index i can be dropped for the functions V and h. Finally,
it is assumed that the functions h and V are di⁄erentiable.1 The dynamic
programming or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for each agent i becomes
1Di⁄erentiability of the value function may only hold for a certain range of parameters.
Furthermore, since the value function for the shallow lake problem is continuous but
not di⁄erentiable, for certain parameters, at the so-called Skiba points (Wagener 2003),
discontinuities of the feedback rule are expected. We focus our analysis on a parameter
range where the value function is di⁄erentiable, since the derivation of equilibrium feedback
strategies with jumps is beyond the scope of this paper and constitutes an area for further
research. It can be said that in the present paper we determine a class of continuous
feedback rules which hold for a certain parameter range, but piecewise continuous feedback
equilibrium strategies may exist for more general parameter ranges.
14￿V (x) = max
ai
fU(ai) ￿ D(x) + V
0(x)[ai + (n ￿ 1)h(x) ￿ bx + f(x)]g: (19)
The optimality condition is
U
0(ai) + V
0(x) = 0: (20)




The dynamic programming or Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation becomes
￿V (x) = U(h(x)) ￿ D(x) ￿ U
0(h(x))[nh(x) ￿ bx + f(x)]: (22)
By di⁄erentiating (22) with respect to x, using the optimality condition (21)
again and rearranging terms, a non-linear ordinary di⁄erential equation in
h(x) is obtained:
[(nh(x) ￿ bx + f(x))U
00(h(x)) + (n ￿ 1)U
0(h(x))]h
0(x) (23)




This equation is called the Euler equation (see Miranda and Fackler, 2002, p.
325-326). The absence of a boundary condition to this equation implies that
multiple feedback Nash equilibria may exist. Only feedback Nash equilibria
15for which the level of pollutants x converges to a steady state are considered.





can be used as a boundary condition for the di⁄erential equation (23). Equa-
tion (24) follows from equation (16) with a = nh(x) and the assumption that
xf is a steady state of the lake.
The contours of the algorithm, that will be presented shortly, will be
clear by now. Starting from a steady state xf, the di⁄erential equation (23)
has a boundary condition (24) and can be solved, which yields a candidate
feedback Nash equilibrium corresponding to that steady state.
Before specifying the functions and parameters in (23) and (24) according
to the shallow lake problem, it is interesting to return for a moment to the
linear-quadratic di⁄erential game of international pollution control (van der
Ploeg and de Zeeuw, 1992), that was mentioned in the introduction. In that
problem the utility and damage functions are both assumed to be quadratic
(U(ai) = ￿ai ￿ 1
2a2
i;D(x) = 1
2￿x2), the internal feedbacks are assumed not
to exist (f(x) = 0), and the number of countries n = 2. The di⁄erential
equation (23) becomes
[3h(x) ￿ bx ￿ ￿]h
0(x) = (￿ + b)h(x) + ￿x ￿ (￿ + b)￿; (25)
with hyperbola as solutions, and the steady states are characterized by a
line, h(x) = b
2x, in the (x;h) space. This situation is depicted in Fig. 1 in
16Dockner and Long (1993), as well as in Rubio and Casino (2002).2
3.1 The Shallow Lake Continued
The speci￿cations for the shallow lake problem (U(ai) = lnai; and D(x) =
cx2;f(x) = x2
x2+1) turn the non-linear ordinary di⁄erential equation (23) into




0(x) = (￿ + b ￿ 2cxh(x) ￿
2x
(x2 + 1)2)h(x) (26)










Note that equation (26) does not explicitly depend on n.
Equation (26) is an Abel di⁄erential equation of the second kind (Mur-
phy, 1960), which cannot be solved analytically. In this paper the ode solver
ode15s of Matlab is used to ￿nd a numerical solution of (26), with boundary
condition (27) (see The MathWorks, 2002, Polyanin and Zaitsev, 1995). In
order to be able to make a comparison with the benchmark cases of optimal
management and the open-loop Nash equilibrium in Section 2.1, the para-
2As suggested by one reviewer, one way of making the connection between the linear-
quadratic version of this di⁄erential game with the non-linear version discussed here, would
be to multiply the non-linear term, f(x), by a small parameter, say " > 0, and obtain
the Nash equilibria as a function of " (assuming that the payo⁄ functions are quadratic,
possibly perturbed by small non-quadratic terms, also multiplied by "). One can obtain
the Nash equilibria in this case (both open-loop and feedback) iteratively, with the zero-
th-order solution (corresponding to " = 0) being the solution to the linear-quadratic game.
Corrections to this zero-th-order solution will then also involve simpler problems, which
are more readily solvable.
17meters are ￿xed at the same values as in Section 2.1: b = 0:6, ￿ = 0:03,
c = 1 and n = 2. The parameter xf denotes the steady state of the feedback
Nash equilibrium. According to the boundary condition (27), it must lie on
the curve h(x) = 1
n(bx ￿ x2
x2+1) in the (x;h) plane, but it is otherwise free so
that a multiplicity of Nash equilibria may result. Note that h represents the
individual loading, so that this curve denotes the steady states of the lake
model (16) because total loading a = nh. Note that when the curve for the
steady states of the lake model (16) in the (x;a) plane, a = bx ￿ x2
x2+1, is
superimposed on the (x;h) plane, this curve represents the points at which
singularities can be expected, because at these points the coe¢ cient of h0(x)
in the di⁄erential equation (26) is equal to 0.
As it was mentioned in the introduction, comparing steady states is one
thing but ultimately the resulting values of the di⁄erent outcomes have to be
compared, taking account of what happens on the trajectories towards the
steady state. These values are a function of the initial state x0. The values







where h(x) is the solution of the di⁄erential equation (26), with boundary
condition (27), and x(t) is the solution of the di⁄erential equation
_ x(t) = nh(x(t)) ￿ bx(t) +
x2(t)
x2(t) + 1
;x(0) = x0: (29)
It will be clear that in general not every steady state xf can be reached from
any initial state x0. It will also be clear that in general not every steady
18state xf will be stable. If, however, a number of stable steady states can be
reached from some initial state, it is assumed that the agents will be able to
coordinate on the best feedback Nash equilibrium, if it exists. This means




where xf must be reachable from x0 and stable, and where it is assumed that
the maximum exists.
The numerical algorithm to characterize the best feedback Nash equilib-
rium for the shallow lake problem consists of the following steps:3
Step 1. For each candidate xf the non-linear ordinary di⁄erential equa-
tion (26) with boundary condition (27) is solved, with the ode solver ode15s
of Matlab, in the intervals [p;xf] and [xf;q], where p and q are chosen ap-
propriately.
Step 2. The numerical solution for h(x) is then used to solve the transi-
tion equation (29) in the interval [0;T], where T is chosen appropriately.
Step 3. Then the value (28) is computed, using a Matlab quad function.
Step 4. Finally, the set of values is maximized over the set of admissible
xf, according to (30).
The results will also be presented in steps. At the end a comparison can
be made with optimal management and the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
3The software code is available through the JEDC supplement archives. Any questions
regarding the code may be directed to M. Plexousakis
193.1.1 Candidate feedback control strategies
Figures 3 to 5 plot the solutions of the non-linear ordinary di⁄erential equa-
tion (26), with boundary condition (27), for three di⁄erent regions for the
candidate steady states xf. Recall that these candidate steady states have
to lie on the curve h(x) ￿ gs (x)=n = 1
n(bx ￿ x2
x2+1), and that the curve
h(x) ￿ gs (x) = bx￿ x2
x2+1 denotes the possible singularities of the di⁄erential
equation.4
Region 1. For xf < 0:17, the pro￿les of the solutions are given by Figure
3. The solution extends backward to the origin and extends forward until it
meets the curve of singularities at an in￿nite slope. The candidate steady
states in this region are not stable. The origin, where the level of pollution
is zero, is not feasible because of the assumptions on the utility function U.
Insert Figure 3 here.
Region 2. For 0:17 < xf < 0:72, the pro￿les of the solutions are given by
Figure 4. The series of pro￿les corresponds to two series of candidate steady
states: a series of increasing unstable steady states , starting at xf = 0:17,
and a series of decreasing stable steady states, starting at xf = 0:72. At the
end, at xf = 0:38, where the pro￿le of the solution is tangent to the curve
h(x) ￿ gs (x)=n = 1
n(bx ￿ x2
x2+1), a steady state results that can be reached
from the right but not from the left.
Insert Figure 4 here.
4It should be noted that the derived pro￿les h(x) do not blow up in ￿nite time, or
do not approach zero as x increases. This suggests that the h(x) pro￿les derived by
the algorithm presented in this paper have a behavior similar to the one expected by
control trajectories of the optimal management or the open-loop problems which satisfy
the conditions discussed in Wagener (2003, see Appendix A).
20Region 3. For xf > 0:72, the pro￿les of the solutions are given by Figure
5. The solution extends backward until it meets the curve of singularities at
an in￿nite slope. The candidate steady states in this region are stable.
Insert Figure 5 here.
3.1.2 Best feedback Nash equilibrium
In Steps 2 to 4 of the numerical algorithm, the initial state x0 has to be
determined. In Region 1, only initial states are feasible that are smaller
than the x-value of the intersection point of the pro￿le, corresponding to
the steady state xf = 0:17, with the curve of singularities. In Region 2,
only initial states are feasible that are larger than the value of the unstable
steady state of the ￿rst pro￿le (x0 = 0:17). In Region 3, only initial states are
feasible that are larger than the x-value of the intersection point of the pro￿le,
corresponding to the steady state xf = 0:72, with the curve of singularities.
By combining these observations, it follows that only initial states are feasible
that are larger than x0 = 0:17.
This can be better explained with the help of ￿gure 6, which is an enlarged
version of ￿gure 4 around xf = 0:38:
Insert Figure 6 here.
For 0:17 < x0 < 0:38, pro￿les can be chosen that start at the unstable
steady state x0 = xf on the curve of the steady states h(x) ￿ gs (x)=n =
1
n(bx￿ x2
x2+1); which is the dashed line labeled SS, leading to a stable steady
state xf on the curve SS between 0:38 and 0:72. Furthermore, pro￿les can
be chosen that start above that point (if possible) resulting in a higher stable
steady state. The maximization in Step 4 shows that it is best to choose
21the pro￿le that starts at the unstable steady state. In ￿gure 6 this means
that, with x0 = 0:24; pro￿les could start at all intersections of the vertical
line through x0 = 0:24: Intersection points of that vertical line with pro￿les
below A are not feasible because the dynamics is unstable. Furthermore, by
maximization it is best to choose point A on SS: This point is unstable and
leads to a stable steady state at B as indicated by the arrows. For x0 > 0:38
(point E in ￿gure 6), pro￿les can be chosen that lead to a stable steady state
above the initial state, and pro￿les can be chosen that lead to a stable steady
state between 0:38 and the initial state. The maximization in Step 4 shows
that it is best to choose the pro￿le that leads (from the right) to the stable
steady state 0:38; which is the pro￿le tangent to the curve of steady states,
SS; from all the possible starting points, at point E.
Figure 7 depicts the relation between the initial state and the resulting
steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium.
Insert Figure 7 here.
It is interesting to note that the selection of the best feedback Nash equi-
librium leads to a form of time-inconsistency for 0:17 < x0 < 0:38. Rubio
and Casino (2002) obtained a similar result for the international pollution
control game. Starting at the initial state x0, it is best to choose the pro￿le
that starts on the curve of steady states h(x) = 1
n(bx ￿ x2
x2+1) at the point
h(x0) lying on the intersection of the vertical line through x0 and the curve
of steady states, like point A in ￿gure 6. However, when the strategies are
reconsidered after some time has elapsed and the state has reached a point
between x0 and 0:38, say point x
0
0; it is best not to follow that same pro￿le
anymore but rather to switch down to the pro￿le that starts on the curve
22h(x) = 1
n(bx￿ x2






. Moreover, if the state moves beyond
0:38, it is best to switch down to the pro￿le that leads the system back to
the stable steady state 0:38. A way to resolve this time-inconsistency is reop-
timizing the feedback Nash equilibrium over time. The resulting trajectory
approximately follows the curve h(x) = 1
n(bx ￿ x2
x2+1) and then converges to
the steady state 0:38. This implies that the steady state 0:38 is an important
point. It is the steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium for initial
states x0 > 0:38, but also for initial states 0:17 < x0 < 0:38 in case the
reoptimization is applied.
3.1.3 Comparison with optimal management and the open-loop
Nash equilibrium
Figures 1 and 2 depict the outcomes for optimal management and the open-
loop Nash equilibrium. For the parameter values b = 0:6, ￿ = 0:03, c = 1,
n = 2, the saddle-point stable steady state for optimal management is equal
to 0:353, and the saddle-point stable steady states for the open-loop Nash
equilibrium are equal to 0:393 and 1:58. Another interesting point is the ￿ip
point: this is the local maximum of the curve for the steady states of the
lake model (16). It is called the ￿ip point because when total loading a is
gradually increased from a low level, at that point the steady state of the
lake will ￿ ip to a substantially higher level of pollution. It is equal to 0:408
for these parameter values.
When these values are compared with the previous results of this section,
the general conclusion for the international pollution control game (Dockner
and Long, 1993) is con￿rmed. The steady state for the best feedback Nash
23equilibrium (0:38) lies closer to the steady state for optimal management
(0:353) than the steady states for the open-loop Nash equilibrium (0:393
and 1:58). Moreover, if the discount rate ￿ approaches 0, then the steady
state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium approaches the steady state of
optimal management: namely for ￿ = 0:02, the values are 0:365 and 0:344,
respectively, and for ￿ = 0:01, the values are 0:344 and 0:336.
However, this picture does not hold for all parameter values. If, for ex-
ample, the number of communities sharing the lake is increased to n = 3, the
steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium becomes 0:417, whereas
the best steady state of the open-loop Nash equilibrium becomes 0:412 (the
optimal management steady state remains 0:353, because this is independent
of the number of communities). The reason is that the steady state of the
open-loop Nash equilibrium has moved beyond the ￿ ip point. It is easy to
see why this happens by looking more closely at equations and graphs above.
First look at the pro￿les of the feedback Nash equilibrium strategies in Fig-
ure 4. These pro￿les have a local maximum for a value of x between 0:17
and 0:72. At such a local maximum h0(x) = 0, so that according to (26)
individual loading there is given by
h(x) =




This corresponds to the following relation between total loading a = nh and
the state x:
a = n




24Note that equation (32) represents the steady states of the di⁄erential equa-
tion for total loading (18) in the MHDS of the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
The argument now goes as follows. In the (x;h) plane, the best steady state
of the open-loop Nash equilibrium is represented by the ￿rst intersection of
the curves (31) and h(x) = 1
n(bx ￿ x2
x2+1). According to equation (31), this
point is also the local maximum of one of the pro￿les of the possible feedback
Nash equilibrium strategies. Because the steady state of the open-loop Nash
equilibrium lies to the right of the ￿ ip point, the curve h(x) = 1
n(bx ￿ x2
x2+1)
is decreasing at this point. It follows that this pro￿le cannot be the pro￿le
of the best feedback Nash equilibrium, because the last one must be tangent
to this curve. Moreover, it follows that the steady state of the best feedback
Nash equilibrium is the tangency point of a lower pro￿le and is therefore
larger than the best steady state of the open-loop Nash equilibrium.
It is still true that lowering the discount rate ￿ moves the steady state
of the best feedback Nash equilibrium towards the steady state of optimal
management. At ￿rst, the e⁄ect of increasing the number of communities n is
neutralized, so that the best steady state of the open-loop Nash equilibrium
moves below the ￿ ip point again, and then the story in the beginning of this
section applies. However, for any ￿xed discount rate ￿, the story works vice
versa: increasing the number of communities n moves the steady state of the
best feedback Nash equilibrium beyond the open-loop one.
Comparisons between the di⁄erent outcomes have focused on steady states
up to now but it is, of course, more important to look at the values V (x0).
In Step 4 of the numerical algorithm above, the value for the best feedback
Nash equilibrium Vf(x0) is explicitly calculated. The same can be done for
25the values for optimal management Vo(x0) and for the open-loop Nash equi-
librium Vn(x0). In Figure 8 the results are presented for a number of values
of the initial state x0 (and for the original set of parameter values).
Insert Figure 8 here
The best feedback Nash equilibrium is generally performing worse than
the open-loop Nash equilibrium, and therefore a fortiori worse than optimal
management, although the di⁄erences are small for initial states between 0.19
and 0.46. Only in the neighborhood of the steady states, the performance is
about the same. This shows that focusing on steady states does not give the
right picture. It cannot generally be concluded that, in this type of models,
Nash equilibria have been found that support optimal management.
4 Conclusion
It is often not realistic to use linear models for natural systems in pollu-
tion control problems. This implies that it is necessary to be able to handle
non-linear di⁄erential games in analyzing pollution control problems with
negative externalities or public bads. This paper provides a numerical solu-
tion procedure to derive feedback Nash equilibria for the shallow lake prob-
lem, a typical example of a non-linear di⁄erential game in environmental and
resource economics.
The literature on linear-quadratic di⁄erential games has shown that non-
linear feedback Nash equilibria exist with steady states that are close to
the optimal management steady state. However, in this paper it is shown
that for non-linear di⁄erential games the steady state of the best feedback
26Nash equilibrium is not necessarily close to the optimal management steady
state. Moreover, this paper shows that even if these steady states are close,
the value of the corresponding feedback Nash equilibrium is generally much
worse than the value of optimal management.
The good news is that we can handle an important class of non-linear
di⁄erential games, but the bad news is that generally the best feedback Nash
equilibrium does not support optimal management. More research is needed
to get better insight into this complicated type of problems.
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